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Abstract
Product Authentication Using Hash Chains and Printed QR Codes
Harshith R. Keni
2016
This thesis explores the usage of simple printed tags for authenticating products.
Printed tags are a cheap alternative to RFID and other tag based systems and do not
require specialized equipment. Due to the simplistic nature of such printed codes,
many security issues like tag impersonation, server impersonation, reader imperson-
ation, replay attacks and denial of service present in RFID based solutions need to be
handled differently. An algorithm that utilizes hash chains to secure such simple tags
while still keeping cost low is discussed. The security characteristics of this scheme
as well as other product authentication schemes that use RFID tags are compared.
Arguments for static tags being at least as secure as RFID tags is discussed. Finally,
a scheme for combining RFID authentication with static tags to achieve security
throughout the supply chain is discussed.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Need for Authentication
According to the International Trademark Association (INTA), counterfeiting is the
illegal practice of manufacturing, importing/exporting, distributing, selling or other-
wise dealing in goods, often of inferior quality [3]. It frequently describes both the
forgeries of currency and documents, as well as the imitations of clothing, handbags,
shoes, pharmaceuticals, aviation and automobile parts, watches, electronics (both
parts and finished products), software, works of art, toys, movies. Counterfeit con-
sumer products have a reputation for being sub-par, of a lower quality and sometimes
even harmful to the user. This has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands
of people, due to automobile and aviation accidents, poisoning, or ceasing to take
essential compounds (e.g. in the case a person takes non-working medicine) [7].
Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is especially alarming and is a serious problem in
both developed and developing countries. Counterfeit drugs account for about 10%
of the global market, amounting to losses around US $ 200 Billion [4]. Numerous
cases of physical harm, and even death, have been reported from consumption of
counterfeit medicine.
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One solution that has been used to combat counterfeiting is detecting counterfeits.
This usually involves using chemical or other scientific analysis to detect a counterfeit
products. The other technique to combat counterfeiting involves preventing counter-
feiting by verifying authenticity of the products. This is usually done using computer
algorithms and is referred to as Authentication. These techniques include using
both overt and covert tactics like holograms, tracers, taggants, inks and electronic
tracking [6].
It is essential that packaging and labeling is engineered to reduce the risk of
counterfeit goods or theft and resale of products [8, 16]. Counterfeit goods, unau-
thorized sales, tampering etc. can all be reduced by securing the packaging and
labeling process. In fact, packaging can itself include security features such as RFID
(Radio-Frequency Identification) tags, tracers or even specialized tracking hardware.
According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), electronic tracking meth-
ods are “the single most powerful tool available to secure the drug supply.” [9]. Most
electronic tracking methods employ some form of RFID-based authentication coupled
with some form of unique identification codes.
Multiple schemes based on RFID have been explored to tackle authenticate prod-
ucts and identify counterfeits[14, 12, 15]. RFID technology requires using specialized
hardware to read RFID tags and might not be feasible for space-constrained pack-
aging like pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, they are expensive and are geared for use
from the point of manufacture to the point of sale/despensing. It is not available at
a per-package or per-pill granualarity for end-users [6].
Printing a static code on a product for authentication is relatively simple and needs
less specialized equipment. Simple, widely available smartphone technology enables
scanning static printed codes easily and is relatively cheap. Due to these reasons, an
Android smartphone application that scans QR Codes (Quick Response Code) was
thus chosen because of relative simplicity and ease of implementation. Additionally,
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a printed QR code can potentially have a larger bandwidth of data transfer than an
RFID tag[1, 2, 18]. Also, smartphones have simple HTTP (Hypertext Trafer Protocol)
network communication capabilities enabling the implementation of messaging and
security protocols, as well as the availability of multiple open-source libraries enabling
rapid prototyping. Due to these reasons, this thesis proposes two schemes for product
authentication that use these technologies which aim to achieve cheap, robust and
secure product authentication for end-users.
1.2 Objectives
The main objective for this project was:
1. To devise a cost-effective electronic authentication solution
2. The solution must also be widely available easy to use for the general public
3. It must be as secure as existing algorithms that use RFID tags
4. A combined approach to tackle authentication along the supply chain must be
investigated
1.3 Organization of Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 explores detailed work-
ings of security algorithms as well as authentication schemes and aims to identify
strengths and weaknesses in them. Chapter 3 describes a proposed scheme that aims
to use static printed codes, like QR Codes, to authenticate individual products while
addressing various associated security problems. Chapter 4 describes a proposed
scheme that attempts to combine individual product and individual package authen-
tication techniques to enable security and tracking along supply chains. Chapter 6
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analyzes and evaluates the proposed schemes, as well as explores comparisons with
other described schemes.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Security background
2.1.1 Cryptographic hash functions
The basic building block for an authentication scheme involves some sort of crypto-
graphic hash function. These cryptographic hash functions are mathematical algo-
rithms that map data of arbitrary size to a bit string of a fixed size in a way which
is impossible or infeasible to invert i.e. the only way to obtain the input data given
some output data is to try a large number of inputs to see if a match is produced.
One way hash functions are an extremely important tool in security applications and
are widely used for multiple applications. The input data is usually referred to as
the message and the output data is referred to as the hash value. Some popular
cryptographic hash functions are MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2, etc.
An ideal cryptographic hash function has the following four properties [19]:
1. it computes the hash value for any given message very quickly
2. it is infeasible to generate a message from its hash value except by using a
brute-force approach
5
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3. any change to the message, even a single bit, changes the hash value extensively
such that the new hash value does not appear related to the old hash value
4. collisions are infeasible and improbable i.e. two messages having the same hash
value will not occur
2.1.2 Hash chains
Hash chains, which involve repeated application of a cryptographic hash function
to a message, are based on Lamport’s scheme [13] to securely authenticate a user
a finite number of times using a one-way encryption function. This allowed the
system to authenticate passwords even if an intruder could eavesdrop or tamper with
the communication between the user and the system in a computationally efficient
manner. A hash chain of length N is construcuted by applying a cryptographic hash
function h() recursively N times to an initial message s.
hN(s) = h(h(...h(s)...))
Due to the one-way nature of cyptographic hash functions, hN−1(s) cannot be
obtained even if hN(s) is known without knowing the initial message s. This key
property of hash-chains is critical to security in product authentication, and multiple
product authentication schemes make use of it.
2.1.3 Security and Privacy of RFID
The most common basic authentication scheme is RFID (Radio Frequency Indenti-
fication) product authentication. Generally speaking, these systems consist of RFID
tags and RFID readers. The tags operate as transponders while the readers operate
as transceivers [21]. For some more complex algorithms, a database server is also
used to store metadata as well as information about both the tags and readers.
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Due to the wireless nature of RFID tags, some fundamental security objectives
such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticaiton, authorization, non-
repudiation and anonymity need to be designed into the system to achieve secure
usage [11].
2.1.4 Security Objectives
Confidentiality
As the communication between reader and tag is unprotected in some cases, it is
possible for eavesdroppers to listen in the immediate vicinity. Furthermore, the tag’s
memory can be read as well. Both these problems can be solved by mutual authen-
tication.
Integrity
With a basic system, the integrity of the information on a tag is not guaranteed. The
tag memory can also be manipulated. Using database servers to store information
about tags with lookup tables helps in avoiding these issues. Furthermore, a hash
chain or general hash function acts as a provision against random failures.
Availability
RFID systems can be disrupted by denial-of-service attacks by jamming the frequency
used for communication or some other techniques. The algorithm trying to secure the
system must account for such attacks. Introduction of a server component further
adds another point for attackers to attempt such attacks. The server maintains some
state-information about the tags, and as such might lose synchronization with the
reader or the tag thereby hampering future authentication.
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Authenticity
The authenticity of a tag is at risk since its memory may be copied and replicated
onto other tags. Various measures need to be taken to make tags tamper resistant or
to mitigate losses from such duplication.
Authorization
Unauthorized readers or readers which have been tampered with must not be able
to falsely authenticate valid tags. Using secure distribution channels for readers as
well as mutual authentication between reader and server (if one is used) can act as
deterrents for such attacks.
2.1.5 Security Characteristics
Forward Security
Also referred to as Backward Traceability, a tag’s future internal state must not be
computable even if previous state was known [20]. This occurs if, given all the internal
state of a target tag at time t, the attacker is able to identify target tag interactions
that occurred at a time t < t where t′ is some time before t.
Anti-Denial of Service
Some denial of service is hardware dependent and can be unavoidable. The system
design can prevent certain denial of service attacks where attempts to overload the
server with authentication mistakes are made. The algorithm must be lightweight
enough to prevent such attacks. Also, certain steps like handshaking can be taken to
prevent loss of synchronization between the tags, readers and server.
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Anti-Reply Attack
Simple capture of a valid authentication request and response and subsequent replay
of the same request must not yield the same response. This can be achieved by
maintaining the state of authentication as well as the current position along the
hash-chain for any product in the server.
Anti-Insider Attack
Secure distribution of readers as well as mutual authentication between tags, readers
and server help prevent insider attacks. If any single component is compromised
through an insider attack, it will fail a mutual authentication step and avoid insider
attacks. Using secure channels for distributing readers to end-users or making the
readers available only through specific trusted sources ensure the authenticity of the
reader itself.
Mutual Authentication
Mutual authentication enables secure communication through complex systems as
well as enables various componenets to be assured of authenticity of the other com-
ponents they might interact with.
2.2 Review of various authentication protocols
Yang [24] proposed a hash-based RFID mutual authentication protocol. In this
scheme, the reader authenticates the tag, the tag authenticates the reader, the reader
authenticates the database, and the database authenticates both the reader and the
tag. Also, initial values are updated occasionally. A shared secret between the com-
ponents allows each component to authenticate each other. Updating this secret is a
way of creating forward security. Also, this protocol is equipped to deal with replay
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attacks. However, this protocol can easily fall prey to denial of service attacks and
insider attacks.
Tsudik [22] proposed a protocol to identify RFID tags untraceably, called YA-
TRAP. Simply, the tag receives a message and checks that the time stamp with this
message is after the previous time received and before the maximum that is set. The
server validates the valid or invalid message from a look up table for this tag. But,
this protocol is very susceptive to denial of service attacks against the tag.
Henrici et al. [10] described a protocol in RFID systems that implemented a hash-
chain called the Triggered Hash Chains Approach - where the value in the RFID tag
is updated only when triggered by the backend server. This approach uses the reader
simply as a channel of communication between the tag and the server which mutually
authenticate each other. Denial of service attacks are prevented by the system’s
ability to backtrack one step. Also, since different hashes are used on the ID and the
messages, an insider attack is thwarted. There is some computation weight on the
server but overall this is also a very non-complex protocol. There is no prevention
against the fact that the hash chain will eventually loop which can result in creation
of a counterfeit.
Cho et al. [5] designed a secret value hash-based mutual authentication protocol
where Mutual Authentication between the tag and server occurs. This approach
makes a strong assumption that the communication between the reader and server
are over a secure channel which is not possible to always ensure.
Ohkubo et al. [18] proposed a hash-based authentication protocol. The aim of
the protocol is to provide better protection of user privacy with the basic concept of
refreshing the identifier of the tag each time it is queried by a reader. The protocol
changes RFID identities on each read based on hash chains. The Hash chain method
is used in these two ways communication of RFID tag. This protocol does not require
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a random number generator. However, it is confirmed that this protocol is flawed to
certain replay attacks [21].
Weis et al. [23] proposed using cryptographically controlled hash locks for RFID
tags. They argued that while hash values can be read by any reader, only authorized
ones would be able to look up the tag information from the server. The objective
was to improve security and privacy by using an integrated hash function where key
could be verified by the server. This protocol does not ensure forward security and is
traceable.
Song et al. [20] created a RFID authentication protocol for low-cost tags. There
are new random numbers between the server and tag which are XORed and bit-
shifted to update secrets used each time, so replay attacks are prevented. Also, this
scheme provides forward security because the new secret is created using both random
numbers generated that round. Additionally, there is mutual authentication between
tag and server. But, this protocol assumes that the communication between the
reader and the server is secure, and the tag is susceptible to denial of service attacks.
It does not check the initial random number received and thus can receive the same
one repeatedly and try to keep up with its own calculations and responses and get
overloaded.
In Tsudik’s and Song’s work[22, 20], and many of the others it is assumed that
there is a secure channel of communication between server and reader. In Yang’s
work[24], it is discussed that most protocols make that assumption. Also, the Tsudik’s
server[22] is assumed not attackable without proper reasoning. In the protocol pro-
posed in this paper, we make no such assumptions.
Chapter 3
Single Product Authentication
In this chapter, we describe our proposed scheme for authenticating a single product
using static QR code based hash chains. First we are going to discuss the design
consideration of our scheme, explain our scheme, and then analyze our scheme.
3.1 Design Consideration
QR Code Reader Server
Figure 3.1: Communication Overview
Most RFID solutions for product authentication use dynamic RFID tags. Some
computation and complexity is thus at the RFID end of the scheme. Our solution,
which uses a statically printed code, does not have the luxury of having the tag per-
forming any sort of computation as it just contains a hash value. The computational
complexity is thus delegated to the reader and server. The first requirement our
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scheme needed to have is to securely authenticate a product. Additionally, the num-
ber of times a product could be authenticated has to be chosen flexibly, depending
on the application, to eventually prevent counterfeiting of the tag cloning. Finally
our scheme must be available to the end-users for product authentication purposes
through widely used distribution method. Our scheme is based on three entities:
tags, tag readers, and the authentication server.
Since the tags have only one functionality (being read), the responsibility of the
dynamic tags such as RFID to keep the secret secure has now moved to the mutual
responsibility of the tag reader and the authentication server. In addition, it is
important that the revelation of the static tag on the product does not reveal any other
important secret and the hash-chain technique will ensure this security. Limiting the
total number that a product can be authenticated can work in analogous to secret
revocation in case of secret leak. Moreover, by printing unique static tag on each
individual product item, we can minimize the risk of mass revocation. Let’s say an
attacker creates C counterfeits of an individual product P . The manufacturer of P
has set N authentications as the limit and has made M such products. Assuming
that care is taken such that N  C is always the case, the manufacturer’s loss for this
product goes from C/(C +M) to N/(C +M) which is also a smaller number. Thus,
the lifetime of C is limited and easier to identify. One situation that we can consider
is the authentication attempt by many customers before it is being purchased. Some
products may not be scanned as frequently as some others. In order to handle this
issue flexibly we make the authentication lifetime dependent on both the product
item and the tag reader. This way a product item can be authenticated beyond the
authentication lifetime if it is being scanned by different readers.
We have to design a reader capable of reading the QR code, processing the security
protocol and relaying the correct information to the server. Because the QR Code
is easy to be read by any third party, the protocol had to securely authenticate the
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read QR code between the reader and server. The message passing between the
reader and server also had to be secured and authenticated to prevent replay and
insider attacks. These can both be prevented by setting up a mutual authentication
mechanism between in reader and the server. We achieved this by using a secret key
that is hardcoded at both ends which is XORed and digested using a cryptographic
hash function similar to the protocol described in [24]. This method allows us to
generate communication tokens efficiently at both ends which can be verified and
updated.
3.2 Algorithm
In this section, we are describing our algorithm depicted in Figure. 3.2 and Figure.
3.3 in the perspective of the reader Rid and the product Pid. The notations used in
our algorithm are summarized as below.
h A cryptographic hash function
f Another hash function,
Pid A unique id for the product
Rid A unique id for the reader
Ss A secret key shared with Rid stored at the server
Sr A secret key shared with the server stored at Rid
N Maximum number of allowed authentications
a Number of times Pid has been authenticated
v A hard-coded secret securely stored on the reader and server
kn n
th value in the hash chain for Pid, kn = h
n−1(k1)
M Authentication message
⊕ XOR operator
|| Concatenation operator
← Substitution operator
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Figure 3.2: Reader Communcation Overview
16
Figure 3.3: Server Communcation Overview
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3.2.1 Reader (idle)
Wait for user to scan
In this state, the reader is idle and waiting for the user to scan a QR code.
3.2.2 Reader (ready)
read Pid||kN+1
t← h(Sr)
s← h(t)
Mr ← s||Rid||Pid
send Mr
The user scans a QR code with the reader. The reader sends a message to the
server with its twice-hashed secret, the Reader ID and the Product ID. The readers
secret is used for mutual authentication with the server.
3.2.3 Reader (auth server)
if t′ = t then
// Server is authenticated
Sr ← f(Sr ⊕ v)
if V alidAuthRequest then
goto auth product
else if UpdateSuccess then
goto display
end if
s← h(h(Sr))
return Mr||s||Rid||Pid′
else
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// Server is not authenticated
display error
end if
This is an intermediate step for authenticating the server as well as acknowledging
the received message by the reader.
3.2.4 Reader (auth product)
if Ms 6= error then
k′ ← ha(Ms)
end if
if k′ = kN+1 then
// Product is authenticated
Mr ← valid
display Authentication success
else
Mr ← invalid
display Invalid product
end if
The reader will calculate a middle hash value here and compare with the one it
received from the server. If they match for the same number of hashing steps, then
we know that the product has been authenticated.
3.2.5 Server (auth reader)
t′ ← h(Ss)
s′ ← h(t′)
if s′ = s then
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// Reader is authenticated
if AuthRequest then
goto auth product
else if UpdateRequest then
goto update product
end if
Ss ← f(Ss ⊕ v)
return Ms||a||t′
else
// Reader is not authenticated
Ms ← reader auth fail
return Ms
end if
This is an intermediate step for authenticating the reader as well as looking up
or updating authentication records for a given Product ID. It also responds with
the server-side mutual authentication information for the reader to authenticate the
server.
3.2.6 Server (auth product)
lookup Rid, Pid
if found then
lookup k1, a
if a > N then
Ms ← product auth fail
else
Ms ← kN−a
end if
20
else
Ms ← product auth fail
end if
The server will lookup the product as well as the number of authentications.
This step ensures that the lifetime of a product being authenticated is limited by a
predefined maximum authentications. A middle hash value in the chain is computed
based on the number of previous authentications and returned back to the reader.
3.2.7 Server (update product)
if Mr = valid then
a← a + 1
end if
The server will update the number of authentications in a separate step after a
handshake in order to ensure the synchronization of the authentication information
of a given product in the database.
3.3 Security Characteristics
There are many ways for an attacker to go after a security protocol. We have done
our best to try and think of them and come up with the best way to counteract
these attacks. Of course, no protocol is one hundred percent secure. The goal of our
approach is to address all possible security issues present in the previously described
protocols while maintaining the simplicity of being able to authenticate a product
using just a static QR Code.
First, to limit the lifetime of counterfeits, the number of authentications through
the hash chains were made finite to a maximum number N through an established
contract between the reader and server. The exact number N can be modified based
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on the actual application. The first value of a hash chain is always a randomly
generated unique string for each individual product which is securely stored on the
server when the product is registered with the server. The hash-chain for that product
is also calculated at this time and a QR code the last hash value in the chain along
with its unique product ID is generated. This process can easily be integrated into
the product’s package printing process.
Because the production of QR codes is inexpensive, a motivated attacker might
obtain multiple valid products and with enough understanding or reverse engineering
of the system, might create a few counterfeits of each QR code to create a large number
of counterfeit products. As the intention of this scheme is for authenticating cheap,
mass-produced items, this kind of effort might not be worthwhile for an attacker
for the relative profits of such counterfeits. Furthermore, it will be physically time-
consuming to obtain enough products with unique QR codes and individually copying
each one. Some techniques like special inks that only work in a specific lighting
condition that is made available in a retail store for consumers to check validity can
also be used to combat such attacks.
The first time a reader is used, it registers its unique ID with the server and the
first shared secret is generated at both ends using this ID. Through the use of shared
secrets that update at each message exchange, the server and the reader mutually
authenticate each other. Also, the update process of the secrets, and the use of the
hash chain to check hash provides forward security. The mutual authentication and
update of the secret prevents a fake reader and a fake server. Therefore, insider
attacks are prevented through this protocol. The update of the secret also prevents
a replay attack. The messages change for each authentication and thus the same one
cannot be reused. Because the QR Code is just a statically printed code, denial of
service attacks against it are trivially impossible. Denial of service attacks against
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the server can be prevented through various security measures like throttling and
whitelisting/blacklisting IP addresses.
Also, a concern is a fake reader that impersonates the real reader and simply
does not communicate with the server. The assumption we made here was that the
distribution channel - like an app market - handles the authenticity and security of
such apps. Impersonating a reader that communicates with the server is impossible
as they mutually authenticate each other. Also, it can be assumed that end-users
who are conscious of product authentication are also inclined to only use authentic
readers from the app market.
3.3.1 Forward Security
Forward security is ensured by the use of hash-chains. As only a middle value between
the first and last value in the hash-chain, going backwards from the last value to
the first, is ever revealed and this cannot be traced back due to the properties of
cryptographic hash functions, forward security is maintained.
3.3.2 Denial of Service (DoS)
Denial of service at the QR Code tag level involves obstruction/destruction of the tag
which is trivial. This type of attack is not very beneficial to the attacker and only
results in the authentication being denied. This is not preventable but the physical
nature of the code means it is localized and difficult to damage codes on a large scale.
At the reader level, the application should be distributed through a secure channel
like an app store. Thus, the app itself should be securely installed. Denial of service
could involve disabling the camera or the smartphone itself, which is prevented by
good design of the smartphone and is outside the scope of this project. No massive
DoS attacks are practical to QR Codes or the reader app.
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At the server level, as it is a HTTP(S) server, multiple types of denial of service
attacks can occur. There are multiple research projects to address this and well known
techniques exist to prevent denial of service for web servers. Also, the server operates
in multiple authentication steps which involves lightweight computation such as just
two hash functions. This eases the burden of handling DoS attacks on the server side.
3.3.3 Replay Attack
The lifetime of each Product ID and thus, each QR code is limited by the length of
the hash chain. It can only be authenticated a finite number of times. Thus, it is
infeasible to make a large number of a copies of a single QR code. This discourages
copying (replaying) of QR codes.
There is mutual authentication between the reader and server using shared secrets
when the reader requests to authenticate a certain code. As each message has a unique
token depending on the current secret, each message is guaranteed to be unique. Thus,
replay attacks can be prevented between the reader and server.
3.3.4 Insider Attack
The QR codes, being static, are trivially unaffacted by insider attacks.
The reader app needs to be distributed through a trusted and secure distribution
channel like an app store to prevent insider attacks. Even if an attacker clones the
reader app, because of the initial reader registration process and shared secrets and
secret resynchronization, only a single clone will ever be validated at any given time.
Multiple invalid requests from the same reader ID can be monitored and blocked at
the server side. Furthermore, the mobile operating system should ensure that the app
is sufficiently sandboxed and its inner functioning obfuscated to prevent intentional
or accidental third party access.
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The server will rely on standard web server techniques for prevention of insider
attacks.
3.3.5 Mutual Authentication
As the QR Code itself is naive and unable to perform any computation, it cannot
perform any sort of mutual authentication with the reader. Instead, the server will
authenticate the QR Code. The reader and server mutually authenticate each other
instead for an added layer of security.
3.4 Complexity Analysis
The following section analysis the performance complexity of the algorithm. A key
to the notation used in analyzing the algorithm as well as for comparison with other
algorithms is as follows.
H A single computation of a crpytographic hash function
S Subtraction computation
R A random number generation computation
K A symmetric encryption/decryption computation
L 128-bit variable stored
N Number of tags stored in database
M Modulo operation
X XOR operation
i Rounding operation
a Number of authentications
3.4.1 Reader (idle)
Wait for user to scan
3.4.2 Reader (ready)
read Pid||kN+1 Space: L
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t← h(Sr) Time: H, Space: L
s← h(t) Time: H
Mr ← s||Rid||Pid
send Mr
3.4.3 Reader (auth server)
if t′ = t then
// Server is authenticated
Sr ← f(Sr ⊕ v) Time: H + X, Space: L
if V alidAuthRequest then
goto auth product
else if UpdateSuccess then
goto display
end if
s← h(h(Sr)) Time: 2H, Space: L
return Mr||s||Rid||Pid′
else
// Server is not authenticated
display error
end if
3.4.4 Reader (auth product)
if Ms 6= error then
k′ ← ha(Ms) Time: H * a, Space: L
end if
if k′ = kN+1 then
// Product is authenticated
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Mr ← valid
display Authentication success
else
Mr ← invalid
display Invalid product
end if
3.4.5 Server (auth reader)
t′ ← h(Ss) Time: H, Space: L
s′ ← h(t′) Time: H, Space: L
if s′ = s then
// Reader is authenticated
if AuthRequest then
goto auth product
else if UpdateRequest then
goto update product
end if
Ss ← f(Ss ⊕ v) Time: H + X, Space: L
return Ms||a||t′
else
// Reader is not authenticated
Ms ← reader auth fail
return Ms
end if
3.4.6 Server (auth product)
lookup Rid, Pid Space: R, N
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if found then
lookup k1, a Space: a
if a > N then
Ms ← product auth fail Space: L
else
Ms ← kN−a Time: H(N - a), Space: L
end if
else
Ms ← product auth fail
end if
3.4.7 Server (update product)
if Mr = valid then
a← a + 1
end if
3.5 Comparison
Table. 3.1 shows a comparison of the security characteristics of our scheme to various
product authentication schemes that use RFID. As discussed previously, these security
characteristics are the basis of calling an algorithm secure. It is necessary that all of
these must be satisfied to prevent or resist major security attacks and achieve all the
security objectives discussed in Sec. 2.1.4. As it can be seen, QR Code Authentication
indeed does satisfy these objectives and has the necessary security characteristics for
good security. This is achieved through clever use of hash-chains for authenticating
tags, mutual authentication between the reader and server and using lightweight,
secure algorithms and platforms in the system.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Security Characteristics
Authentication Protocol Forward
Security
Anti-
Denial
of Ser-
vice
Anti-
Replay
attack
Anti-
insider
attack
Mutual
Authen-
tication
Hash-based RFID Mutual
Authentication Protocol [24]
Yes No Yes No Yes
YA-TRAP[22] No No Yes No No
Triggered Hash Chain[10] No Yes No No Yes
Secret Value Hash-based Mu-
tual Authentication[5]
No No No No Yes
Cryptographic Approach to
”Privacy-Friendly Tags” [18]
No No No No No
Hash-Based Access Control
[23]
No Yes Yes No No
RFID-Authentication for
Low-Cost Tags [20]
No No Yes Yes Yes
Our Protocol Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
A Comparison of the complexity of the algorithms used can be seen in Table. 3.2.
Each algorithm is evaluated using the original provided algorithm by its author(s).
The methodology used is similar i.e. counting the presence of various types of key
computations, accounting for the various different techniques and notations used to
present the algorithms.
29
Table 3.2: Complexity Analysis
Authentication Protocol Time complexity Space complexity
Hash-based RFID Mutual Au-
thentication Protocol [24]
Tag: 4H + 1R
Reader: 5H + 2R +
1K
Database: 3H, 1K
Tag: 1L
Reader: 1L
Database: 2NL
YA-TRAP [22] Tag: 1H + 1S + 2C
Reader: -
Database: L
Tag: 3L
Reader: clock
Database: NL
Triggered Hash Chain [10] Tag: 3H
Reader: -
Database: 3H
Tag: 1L
Reader: -
Database: 5NL
Secret Value Hash-based Mutual
Authentication [5]
Tag: 2H + 2M + 1R
Reader: R
Database: 2N
(worst-case)
Tag: 2L
Reader: -
Database: 3NL
Cryptographic Approach to
”Privacy-Friendly Tags” [18]
Tag: 2H
Reader: -
Database: 2NiH
Tag: 1L
Reader: -
Database: 2NL
RFID-Authentication for Lot-
Cost Tags [20]
Tag: 3H
Reader: 1R
Database: 2NH, 1H
Tag: 1L
Reader: -
Database: 4NL
Our Protocol Tag: -
Reader: (5+a)H+X
Database: (4 + N −
a)H + X
Tag: -
Reader: 5L
Database: (R + N +
4)L + N ∗ a
Chapter 4
Multiple Product Authentication
In this chapter, we describe our proposed scheme for authenticating a product along
with its parent packaging using static QR code based hash chains. First we are
going to discuss the design consideration of our scheme, explain our scheme, and then
analyze our scheme.
4.1 Design Consideration
For this combined approach, both the packaging and inner products must be authet-
icated together. This is required to track a product through its supply chain and
authenticate it along the way through the whole supply chain. Also, it is assumed
that multiple levels of packaging can exist in the supply chain and each outer layer
can have multiple products inside. The basic case considered here is two layers, a
packaging layer which contains multiple products, both of which must be authenti-
cated.
The combined authentication scheme must be able to maintain this hierarchical
relationship between products and packaging, as well as track the progress through
the supply chain while authenticating at each point.
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This approach to achieve these goals include combining RFID based authentica-
tion at the package level with the QR Code based scheme at the product level. As the
packaging needs to only be authenticated at the supply chain level, and not by the
end user, the costs associated with obtaining an RFID reader can be justified for the
added layer of security. Furthermore, this allows independent authentication using
QR Codes for individual products as described in Ch. 3. A simple RFID scheme
like the ones described in [22, 5, 18, 24] or the scheme described in Ch. 3 can be
used for package authentication with a few modifications. This algorithm attempts
to combine the expensive but secure RFID based authentication at the supply side
with cheaper QR-Code based authentication at the user side.
The primary requirement is to maintain the hierarchy of products on the database
server. It is also a good idea to record the authentications in database server for
tracking purposes. An additional and optional locking step can also be included in
child products to enable theft detection.
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4.2 Algorithm
Figure 4.1: Communication Overview
In this section, we are describing our algorithm depicted in Figure. 4.1 The
notations used in our algorithm are summarized as below.
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f A cryptographic hash function
PPid A unique id for a parent (outer) packaging
CPid A unique id for a child (inner) packaging
Ss A secret key shared with Rid stored at the server
Sr A secret key shared with the server stored at Rid
kn n
th value in the hash chain for Pid, kn = h
n−1(k1)
M Authentication message
|| Concatenation operator
← Substitution operator
4.2.1 Parent Ready (parent ready)
read PPid||PPkn
A user will scan the Parent tag. This includes information about the product id as
well as a middle value in a hash chain obtained using some authentication algorithm
that uses hash chains for security. It is assumed that this tag is authenticated already
at the scan.
4.2.2 Child Ready (child ready)
read CPid||CPkN+1
A user subsequently must also scan a Child tag. This includes the product id and
authentication information similar to the protocol described in Ch. 3.
4.2.3 Combine (combine request)
Mr ← CPid||PPid||Rid
send Mr
A combination of the read information along with the reader’s unique id is sent
to the server.
4.2.4 Compare (compare)
if Ms = f(Sr||PPkn||CPkN+1) then
display Auth success
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else
display Auth failure
end if
The server must authenticate the reader and subsequently ensure that the authen-
ticated parent tag is a valid parent of the scanned child tag. It must then authenticate
the child tag and respond with an appropriate message. The reader must then au-
thenticate the server and display the returned message.
4.3 Security Characteristics
As seen in the algorithm, the authentication of both the package and the product
involves both the reader and the server, as well as the tags themselves. The RFID
tag on the package will authenticate itself and relay its unique identifier to the reader.
Similarly, the read will scan the QR code on the product to obtain its unique identifier.
Then the server and reader will apply the same cryptographic hash function on the
combination of the read data along with the device secret to assess authenticity.
Furthermore, the server is responsible for checking the validity of the hierarchy that
is passed by the reader. There exists mutual authentication between the reader and
server as described in Ch. 3.
Like the protocol described in Ch. 3, this algorithm must ensure that it serves as
a deterrent for as many types of attacks as possible. It must do this while being able
to accomodate various algorithms for authenticating the packaging at the distributor
or supply side as well as products inside that packaging at the user or consumer side.
First and foremost, the inclusion of a hierarchical, tree-like, relationship between
various tags that are created by the system enables the tight coupling of the tags
which allows for tracking as well as detecting unexpected authentication attempts. To
ensure this, each tag must have unique identifiers as well as a securely and randomly
generated hash chain. The number of possible authentications for parent and child
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tags can be adjusted according to the actual application and nature of the supply
chain.
Due to this tight coupling, if some information like the place, time and person that
authenticates parent tags is captured within the system, tracking of any subsequent
false-authentications, detection of counterfeits due to repeated false authentication
etc. can be tracked quite easily and isolated to the point of loss in the supply chain.
Furthermore, if we encounter child tags that are attempted for authentication before
its parent is authenticated, we can easily detect a possible scenario of theft or some
other form of loss in the supply chain.
As previously discussed, the reader and server must mutually authenticate each
other to ensure that line of communication is secured to prevent various attacks.
4.3.1 Forward Security
Both parent and child tags have hash-chains associated with them. Based on previ-
ous arguments, it can be assumed that forward security is maintained at both points.
Furthermore, because of the tight coupling of the tags, it is not possible to authenti-
cate a child without its parent being authenticated. This step would involve actually
opening the parent packaging physically to access the inner products. This ensures
that authentication attempts at inner products must succeed a valid authentication
of its parent as well as a combined authentication of both upon the package being
opened.
4.3.2 Denial of Service
Denial of Service for QR code or other printed tags have been discussed previously.
Denial of Service for RFID tags are possible over long ranges by frequency through
various means including frequency jamming, electromagnetic pulses etc. The RFID
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tags themselves must be able to resist such attacks and are outside the scope of an
algorithmic approach to resist such attacks.
4.3.3 Replay Attack
Due to the use of hash-chains, the lifetimes of both the outer packaging and inner
products are limited. Furthermore, the middle hash value that is used to authen-
ticate the combination of these tags are always a different pair that are backwards
untraceable. As the state of current authentication is held in a central database
server, replay attacks are meaningless a certain pair of authentication hash values
expire immediately after a single use.
4.3.4 Insider Attack
RFID tags are indeed capable of being vulnerable to insider attacks at an individual
level. Overall, such tampering would only invalidate the RFID tag as the central
database server stores state information for the tag and limits the lifetime of the
number of authentications. Any insider attack at the RFID tag will thus only render
that tag unable to be authenticated and will not lead to false-positive authentications.
4.3.5 Mutual Authentication
The mutual authentication between the tag and the reader is possible and dependent
on the algorithm being used for authenticating the tags.
Chapter 5
Implementation
As an exercise to verify the algorithms through a proof of concept as well as to
simulate its operation, we implemented the system using some basic technology.
The single product authentication algorithm was implemented on the Android
smartphone operating system as the reader and a simple HTTP server. The camera
present on smartphones were used to scan the QR codes. MD5 was the chosen
cryptographic hash function used for this, though others could be used as well.
Each product had to be registered in the server prior to an online generation of
the QR code for it, which could be subsequently printed. Furthermore, the reader
devices would register themselves when first opened with the server if an internet
connection was present. The server was hosted on the cloud for easy access across
networks, but could be hosted on a local network as well.
The Fig. 5.1, Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.3 are screenshots that show the QR code being
scanned as well as successful and unsuccessful authentications.
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Figure 5.1: Scanning a QR Code
The multi-level authentication was simulated using a hash-chain for the parent
packaging. The server built the hierarchy tree of products during the initial registra-
tion. It was assumed that every authentication of the parent packaging was successful
and returned a middle hash value to the reader. The authentication was handled as
described in Ch. 4 from there. The Fig. 5.4 is a screenshot of a parent and child
packaging being authenticated together.
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Figure 5.2: Successful Authentication
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Figure 5.3: Failed Authentication
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Figure 5.4: Combined Authentication
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Most research in product authentication use RFID tags, which can be expensive,
complicated and need special hardware for use. We approached this problem using
a different perspective and attempted to use user-friendly mechanisms for product
authentication. Due to the ubiquity of smartphones with cameras, and the ease of
use of being able to scan a simple QR code, product authentication can be made
easier and more available to a general audience. Overall, we established that despite
using a simpler medium like a QR code for storing security information, a protocol
can be designed which can securely identify counterfeits and mitigate losses due to
counterfeiting while empowering users to be more aware of the product they are
using. It is fairly simple to build an application that piggybacks on this authentication
scheme and allow companies to provide more detailed information about their product
to users and engage with them.
A combined approach of using RFID tags along with printed QR Codes allows
the whole supply chain to be securely authenticated and provides additional security
features such as tracking, detection of loss, theft prevention, etc. Furthermore, this
allows more secure but complex and expensive authentication techniques to be used
at the supply-chain side where the cost is bearable by the manufacturer or distributor.
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The consumers still get the benefits of having a low-cost solution for authenticating
products conveniently.
This scheme can also be structured to work with barcodes or simple black printing
of the ID and the hash value. A main assumption that we held while developing this
scheme was that a counterfeiter could access the information in the QR Code. In
other words, the information printed directly on a product was not assumed secure.
Overall, our authentication scheme is a new twist on the research that has been done
in this area. Most researchers concern themselves with the RFID tag, but that is too
expensive to be considered for many small products. For example, you cannot put an
RFID tag on every aspirin pill created. That is what this scheme looks at. We took
the strategies implemented in RFID security and adapted them to create our scheme
without an RFID tag.
In the future, this protocol can have a broader impact by using covert inks and
specialized readers for an added layer of security at the cost of reduced availability to
the general public [17]. Such a technique can be integrated into a product’s supply
chain to improve tracking by manufacturers and prevent loss, leakage or theft at any
point. This scheme will have to be extended further to ensure that it can securely
handle the complexities of a realistic supply chain while still maintaining simplicity
and security.
Because of the widespread use of smartphones, other capabilities of these devices
can be leveraged further in tackling counterfeits. Using the smartphone’s location, an
identified counterfeit can be geotagged and hotspots of counterfeiting can be recorded.
This kind of data collected can be useful for investigative purposes for finding and
tracking counterfeits.
Further work can also be done using similar schemes to authenticate digital media
with embedded or steganographically hidden metadata since such an approach will
rely on using static codes too.
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The combined approach for authentication has multiple applications in securing
various types of supply chains. An experimental approach of testing various methods
of combined authentication will be useful in evaluating the best algorithms for the
task for given authentication scenarios and use-cases. This combined approach can
be expanded further to use multiple algorithms as well as a more complex graph of
relationships between tags for complex real-world scenarios for authentication.
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